What happens when an NFL franchise costs $20 billion, $30 billion, or more? Forbes estimated the average NFL franchise at $9.5 billion in September 2026, up from $4.5 billion in 2022. The Dallas Cowboys topped the list at $17 billion. These are estimated enterprise values, which include net debt, rather than actual sale prices.

As prices climb, buyers will need to put together larger ownership groups to afford teams. I believe the NFL should make that process easier. But there is another limit: if prices keep growing faster than earnings, the investment becomes harder to justify. More flexible financing can help buyers afford a team. It cannot guarantee a good return.

This question goes beyond the NFL. As teams across sports become more expensive, buyers will face the same challenge of putting the money together and deciding whether the returns are worth it.

The more expensive a team becomes, the harder it is to buy. Unless buyers’ purchasing power keeps pace, higher prices reduce the number of people who can afford ownership.

Even then, being wealthy enough does not mean someone wants to buy an NFL team. Buyers must be interested, meet league requirements and agree that the price is worth paying. The number of billionaires may grow, but their money can go elsewhere. They might prefer another sport, a business or real estate. Available wealth is not the same as demand for NFL ownership.

Recent sales show that buyers are still competing. Denver’s 2022 auction attracted four second-round bids above $4 billion. Seattle sold for a reported $9.612 billion in 2026 after receiving at least four bids. Those sales show that buyers can afford today’s prices. They do not tell us how many would compete at $20 billion or $30 billion. Buyers also have limits. During Washington’s sale, Tilman Fertitta said he would not raise his $5.6 billion offer to $6 billion. Having the money does not mean accepting any price.

My concern is that rising prices will make teams harder to buy, while leaving sellers dependent on a small group of people who can afford ownership and actually want it. Having only 32 franchises helps support their value. It does not mean buyers will pay any price or accept any financial return.

I expect larger groups of investors to become more common as franchise prices rise. The NFL should make those purchases easier to finance while keeping one clearly accountable controlling owner.

Families can remain in charge without paying for the entire acquisition themselves. They can bring in other wealthy individuals, family offices and approved institutional investors.

This is already happening. Josh Harris assembled approximately 20 limited partners to buy Washington for $6.05 billion. His proposed financing needed adjustments before league approval. Seattle’s ownership group includes the Khosla family, other individual and family investors, Carlyle and Dynasty Equity, and Sixth Street.

These examples show how buyers are adapting. At higher prices, I expect more acquisitions to rely on several investors pooling their money around a lead owner. The NFL began allowing approved private equity investment in 2024. Together, those investors can own up to 10% of a team. Their stakes are passive, and they must generally hold them for at least six years. September 2026 reporting said owners had no immediate plans to increase the cap.

As prices rise, I believe the NFL should consider increasing the cap to 15% or 20%. It should also review how much ownership a new controlling buyer must personally hold. Increasing one allowance without reviewing the other may leave the biggest financing hurdle in place.

Under the general 30% requirement for a new controlling buyer, a hypothetical debt-free purchase at $20 billion of equity value would require a $6 billion controlling stake. More private equity could help fund the rest, but the lead buyer would still need an enormous commitment. These changes would also help existing owners sell smaller stakes without giving up control. However, that money goes to the selling shareholder. It only funds the team’s operations or projects when the transaction puts new capital into the business.

More flexible rules would give buyers and sellers more options. But those options only work if investors want the investment at the asking price.

Allowing private equity to buy more of a team does not mean funds will consider the price worth paying. They still need to deliver returns to their investors.

An individual owner may accept a lower financial return because ownership brings enjoyment, status, relationships and a family legacy. Funds have different goals and investment periods, but personal enjoyment cannot count toward the return they deliver. My concern is that franchise prices could keep increasing much faster than the financial performance supporting them. A team can grow its business while becoming a less attractive investment for the next buyer.

There is already evidence of prices rising faster than revenue. Forbes estimated that the NFL’s average enterprise-value-to-revenue multiple increased from 8.3 times in 2022 to 13.4 times in 2026. Buyers are paying more for each dollar of annual revenue. That does not establish how earnings have grown, but it shows that revenue growth alone does not explain the increase in valuations.

The same issue matters even more when comparing prices with earnings. Consider a hypothetical debt-free team valued at $10 billion with $200 million in annual EBITDA (annual EBITDA—a measure of operating earnings). Later, its valuation reaches $20 billion, while EBITDA grows to $250 million.

The business improved: EBITDA increased 25%. But the price doubled. A new buyer would pay 80 times EBITDA instead of 50 times. The team is making more money, yet the buyer is paying substantially more for each dollar it earns. That higher price needs a financial explanation. Will earnings grow faster in the future? Will the team generate larger cash distributions? Can the investor eventually sell at a price that delivers an acceptable return?

Brand strength, reliable income and future growth can justify a premium. Prestige and exclusivity may also influence what an individual pays. But private equity cannot assume that those ownership benefits will produce enough cash or resale value for its fund investors. This is the limit of expanding institutional ownership. Raising the cap gives funds permission to invest more. However, it does not improve the return available at a particular purchase price.

If prices continue outpacing expected earnings and distributions, I expect some funds to stop buying at those prices. Owners could reject lower offers rather than sell immediately. The adjustment could appear first through fewer completed transactions, slower appreciation or flat valuations while earnings catch up.

The NFL can make ownership easier to finance. It cannot make every price financially attractive.

I expect NFL ownership to involve larger groups of investors as teams become more expensive. The league should give those groups more flexibility to raise money. However, I also expect valuation growth to cool if prices keep outpacing earnings. More capital can help buyers afford a team, but the expected returns still need to justify the price.

This goes beyond the NFL. As team prices rise across different sports markets, I expect more buyers to face similar dilemmas.